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individualism in cognitive 
science
« 1 » according to classic cognitivist, 
i.e., computationalist/internalist theories, 
the brain is the most central part of the 
central nervous system, where everything 
of importance concerning cognition, ac-
tion, self-awareness and our relations with 
others happens. Michael Gazzaniga (1998), 
in his prediction that psychology will be a 
thing of the past, to be replaced by neurosci-
ence, provides a nice example of an idea that 
operates in numerous theories of cognition, 
namely that psychological processes are re-
ducible to neurological processes:
“ My view of how the brain works is rooted in an 
evolutionary perspective that moves from the fact 
that our mental life reflects the actions of many, 
perhaps dozens to thousands, of neural devices 
that are built into our brains at the factory. These 
devices do crucial things for us, from managing 
our walking and breathing to helping us with syl-
logisms.” (Gazzaniga 1998: xiii)
« 2 » The related claim by alvin Gold-
man and Frederique de vignemont (2009: 
154) that the “central system of the mind [… 
i.e., ] the brain is the seat of most, if not all, 
mental events” represents a similar view. ac-
cording to this classic orthodoxy, the brain 
is where emotions happen; it is where inten-
tions are formed, and actions are prepared; 
it is where our understanding of others takes 
shape. if there is a self it is in the brain (e.g., 
northoff et al. 2006), or as Francis Crick 
once put it: “You’re nothing but a pack of 
neurons” (Crick 1994: 1). This neurocentric 
view has become so pervasive it is taught to 
parents who want to understand their chil-
dren. Thus, a website1 devoted to children’s 
1 | http://kidshealth.org/en/parents/brain-
nervous-system.html accessed 17 May 2018.
health states: “The brain is like a central 
computer that controls all bodily functions 
[…]” Likewise, according to many research-
ers, improving education involves learning 
how the brain learns, since that is where 
learning happens (e.g., Blakemore & Frith 
2005; Jones 2009).
« 3 » in thinking about cognition, self, 
agency, free will, autonomy, social cognition, 
and other aspects of mind – and in think-
ing about when things go wrong in these 
domains (as in psychopathology) – neuro-
centrism (or neuroessentialism) is standard. 
indeed, recently developed neuro-based dis-
ciplines – neurophilosophy, neurotheology, 
neuroeconomics, neuro-marketing, neuro-
aesthetics, neuropolitics, neurolaw, neuroed-
ucation, and so on – purportedly help us to 
explain any topic. across a number of fields, 
neurocentrism has strong advocates who de-
fend it as the only or best way to think about 
such things (e.g., Huber & Kutschenko 2009; 
titley, Brunel & Hansel 2017; shelley 2013; 
Lee, vanderPloeg & strifler 2016).
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« 4 » in philosophy, neurocentrism 
as a form of internalism is represented by 
the well-known brain-in-the-vat thought 
experiment, which, beyond its use as a 
thought experiment, is sometimes pro-
posed as a model for our best understand-
ing of how things work.
“ some form of internalism must be right be-
cause there isn’t anything else to do the job. The 
brain is all we have for the purpose of represent-
ing the world to ourselves and everything we can 
use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs 
must be possible for a being who is a brain in a 
vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat; 
the vat is a skull and the ‘messages’ coming in are 
coming in by way of impacts on the nervous sys-
tem.” (searle 1983: 230)
« 5 » in theories of social cognition, we 
find a complementary focus on method-
ological individualism – the idea that we 
can find a complete explanation of how we 
understand others in a set of mechanisms 
that are entirely contained in the individual 
brain – a theory of mind module (toMM) 
or a mirror neuron system that automatical-
ly simulates the other person’s mental states.
« 6 » neurocentrism can be described 
as a “narrow” perspective on cognition. 
The term “narrow” is a technical term in 
philosophy of mind. it refers to processes 
contained “in the head” – for example, 
brain-based representational processes and 
contents. narrow-minded views have been 
challenged by “wide” “E-approaches” – that 
is, embodied, embedded, extended, enac-
tive, ecological approaches to cognition, 
which in various ways argue that the unit 
of explanation ought to be brain-body-
environment. on such externalist views, 
the brain is not dismissed as unimportant 
for understanding cognition, action, emo-
tion, human experience, and so on; rather it 
is decentered and given a partial, although 
still important, role to play along with bodi-
ly and environmental factors.
« 7 » in this target article i review four 
areas or issues where challenges by these 
E-approaches have provided good reasons 
to shift away from neurocentric theories: 
perception, agency and free will, self, and 
social cognition. Each of these is a com-
plex and multifaceted topic, and i will not 
be able to do justice to any one of them 
here.2 My intent is to paint a large picture 
and to suggest that, taken together, such 
analyses form a comprehensive alternative 
to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, 
computational neuroscience. if one thinks 
of these different areas of research as four 
distinct topics, then one might also think 
that these apparently dissociated investiga-
tions actually converge on some basic as-
sumptions about how to best make sense 
of cognitive phenomena. i will try to show, 
as we go along, however, that the conver-
gence of principles reflects deeper connec-
tions among these areas. Before turning to 
these topics, i will discuss the idea that we 
need to re-think our understanding of how 
the brain itself works, specifically from the 
perspective of phylogeny, the importance of 
which was already intimated by Gazzaniga.
Brain, body and beyond
« 8 » The neural reuse hypothesis is an 
important and influential insight into how 
we understand brain functions. as Michael 
anderson (2010) explains it, neural circuits 
originally established for one use can be re-
used or redeployed for other purposes while 
still maintaining their original function. 
This hypothesis was originally understood 
in terms of an evolutionary notion of plas-
ticity, exaptation: “the shift in the course 
of evolution of a given trait or mechanism, 
which is later on reused to serve new pur-
poses and functions” (Gallese 2014: 6). a 
good example is Broca’s area in the human 
brain. The homologous area in the monkey 
involves motor functions. across evolution-
ary changes it retains these original func-
tions – movement preparation, action se-
quencing, and action imitation (Binkofski & 
Buccino 2004). But, in the human, this area 
is exapted for additional functions involving 
language and action recognition functions. 
its function in speech production has been 
2 | These are all themes that i have discussed 
extensively in other publications. on perception, 
see Gallagher (2015a, 2017; Gallagher & Zahavi 
2012; Hutto et al. in press), on agency, autonomy 
and free will, see Gallagher (2006, 2007, 2012, 
2013a); on self, see Gallagher (2000, 2013b; Gal-
lagher & daly 2018); and on social cognition, see 
Gallagher (2001, 2005, 2008a, 2008b).
long known and well established (Broca 
1861). The presence of mirror neurons in 
this area links it to action recognition (riz-
zolatti et al. 1996). Mirror neurons are an-
other example of reuse: originally motor 
neurons involved in motor control, they are 
exapted in the course of evolution to serve 
social cognition.
« 9 » This idea of reuse has been ap-
propriated by a narrow, internalist “weak” 
conception of embodied cognition (EC). 
according to weak EC, neither the physical 
body itself (its anatomy, activity, postural 
body-schematic processes) nor the environ-
ment is an important contributory to cog-
nition. rather, what is important for weak 
EC are B(ody)-formatted representations 
and the reuse hypothesis. B-formatted rep-
resentations are non-propositional intero-
ceptive or motoric representations “of one’s 
own bodily states and activities” (Goldman 
2012: 74). These B-formats are character-
ized as “sanitized” neural representations 
(Goldman & de vignemont 2009), and are 
sometimes discussed under the heading of 
the “body in the brain” (e.g., Berlucchi & 
aglioti 2010). on the weak EC view, the re-
use hypothesis is put to use as follows: any 
cognitive task that employs a B-formatted 
representation in either its original function 
or its exapted/derived function is, on this 
definition, a form of embodied cognition. 
Examples include not only mirror neurons 
and their role in social-cognitive simulation, 
but also Friedemann Pulvermüller’s (2005) 
language-grounding hypothesis – the idea 
that action words, like lick, pick, and kick 
activate cortical motor areas that involve 
tongue, hand, and foot, respectively. in this 
case, motor areas and interoceptive, B-for-
matted motor representations are reused for 
language processing. along this same line, 
by simulation or metaphor, one can explain 
the embodied roots of abstract thought 
(Barsalou 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). 
Thus, “higher-order thought is grounded in 
low-level representations of motor actions” 
(Goldman 2014: 94).
« 10 » The evolutionary principle of 
reuse can get reframed as a developmen-
tal principle, in, for example, stanislas 
dehaene’s (2005) “neuronal recycling” hy-
pothesis, according to which there are on-
togenetic changes in the “visual word form 
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to read. Goldman also uses the concept of 
reuse to apply to token neural activations 
and cognitive events. For example, he men-
tions “reusing or redeploying B-formats to 
execute a fundamentally non-bodily cogni-
tive task” (Goldman 2012: 83), an example 
of which is the activation of mirror neurons, 
which is “a redeployment of the motoric 
format in a novel, cognitively interpersonal, 
task” (ibid: 79).
« 11 » in Gallagher (2015b, 2018), i ar-
gued that accepting these extensions in the 
use of the reuse hypothesis, including de-
haene’s (2005) neuronal recycling hypoth-
esis, and Pulvermüller’s (2005) language-
grounding hypothesis, actually undermines 
a purely internalist account of cognition 
– across all timescales: evolutionary, devel-
opmental, and the timescale of everyday ac-
tion.
« 12 » indeed, accepting the concepts 
of neuronal reuse implies a strong view of 
EC. on the timescale of evolution, reuse has 
everything to do with the body – including 
its morphological features, which are dis-
missed as trivial by weak EC (Goldman & 
de vignemont 2009). specifically, and obvi-
ously, the human brain evolves with the hu-
man body. Evolutionary changes in the body 
that allow for the upright posture, leading to 
a restructuring of the skull and jaw, allow for 
a larger brain and for the development of 
speech. These changes are accompanied by 
many other morphological changes involv-
ing hands, feet, etc., all of which drive evo-
lutionary changes in the brain, and promote 
reuse.
« 13 » not only the body, but also physi-
cal, social, and cultural environments are 
important factors, both evolutionarily and 
developmentally, for any understanding 
of neural reuse or neuronal recycling. The 
importance of these non-neural factors is 
supported by naturalistic research in re-
cent biology seeking to understand “niche 
construction,” “coevolution of culture and 
genes,” or, more generally, the “social brain 
hypothesis” (andler 2016: 303–313). nei-
ther brain evolution nor brain development 
happens in vitro or in a vat. The role of the 
cultural environment, for example, is direct-
ly relevant in developmental contexts. This 
remains unstated, but implicit even in Gold-
man’s discussion of Pulvermüller’s work in 
neural linguistics – “an excellent example 
of the redeployment of an older (motoric) 
system, featuring a bodily format, to help 
execute tasks of language comprehension.”3 
activation of perceptual or motor areas for 
language and conceptual processing is not 
just the result of brain plasticity, but cultural 
practices and learning. The roles of culture 
and context (including bodily practices and 
environmental factors), apply equally to to-
ken events. For example, motor simulations 
related to word processing in the context of 
a sentence are more specific than the mean-
ing represented by the abstract verb outside 
of a sentence (naumann 2016): one would 
expect a different pattern of neural activa-
tion for the sentences “Bill picked up the 
needle” versus “Bill picked up the barbell” 
– since there are differences in both neural 
and bodily activations for the differences in 
grasping (the picking up) involved in such 
actions. importantly, the neural activation 
will depend not only on knowing what a 
barbell is, or what a needle (or what kind 
of needle – sewing, compass, hypodermic) 
is, but also to some significant extent on the 
history of one’s use of such items, and one’s 
skill level, one’s bodily practices (consider 
novice versus expert seamstress or weight-
lifter).
« 14 » such things are not just neuronal, 
but also involve bodily, social and cultural 
factors. This requires a reinterpretation of 
the notion of reuse. The plasticity involved 
here is not just neuronal plasticity, but, 
more importantly, metaplasticity (Mala-
fouris 2013); not just brains, but bodies and 
environments, and social and cultural prac-
tices undergo interrelated reuse or plastic 
changes due to their on-going, dynamical 
interactions across all relevant timescales.
“ More than just evolving (in the restricted dar-
winian sense of variation under natural selection), 
we have been altering our own developmental 
paths [including our own brains] by making and 
changing the material means by which we engage 
the world […]. The plasticity of the mind is em-
bedded and inextricably enfolded with the plas-
ticity of culture.” (Malafouris 2015: 351)
3 | Goldman (2014: 103). note, however, that 
there have been some replication problems re: 
semantic somatotopy (Bedny & Caramazza 2011; 
Willems et al. 2009; Postle et al. 2008; naumann 
2011).
« 15 » Full consideration of the reuse 
hypothesis leads us directly to the role of 
body and environment, including cultural 
context. The unit of explanation is not just 
the brain, not just the body, not just the 
environment, but the brain-body-environ-
ment (Gallagher et al. 2013). in evolution-
ary terms, the brain operates the way it does 
because it is part of an organism that has 
hands that can reach and grasp in specific 
ways, and eyes structured to focus, an up-
right posture, an autonomic system, and so 
forth, all of which evolved to cope with spe-
cific kinds of environments, and with other 
people. Changes to any component of the 
individual’s bodily, environmental, or expe-
rienced social-cultural context will elicit re-
sponses from the system as a whole. as the 
enactivists have argued, rather than internal 
mental representations or the computation 
of information, we should understand the 
brain as participating in the overall ac-
tion of the system as a whole (anderson 
& Chemero 2017; di Paolo & de Jaegher 
2012; Fuchs 2018; Gallagher 2017; Hutto & 
Myin 2013; Thompson 2007).
« 16 » We can see this broader enac-
tivist notion of reuse in the following four 
issues. Within each analysis the idea that 
we can explain the phenomenon mainly in 
terms of brain processes breaks down and 
we are led to see the irreducible role of non-
neural processes. Moreover, perception, 
agency/action, self and social cognition are 
topics thought to be basic and central to 
most other processes of interest to cognitive 
science. understanding how the brain func-
tions within the wider system with respect 
to these issues will go a long way towards 
laying the groundwork for a more compre-
hensive and less neurocentric cognitive sci-
ence.
Perception
« 17 » on neurocentric theories, per-
ception is something that happens in the 
brain. depending on how rigidly one wants 
to distinguish perception from cognition, 
on the one side, and action, on the other, 
perception may be narrowed down to ac-
tivation of the primary or early perceptual 
areas (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile cortexes) 
with meaningful content being added by 
11
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higher-level cognitive or conceptual repre-
sentations, and all of this followed by mo-
toric processing leading to action. This is 
what susan Hurley (1998) critically called 
the “sandwich model” of perception, where 
sensory input leads to higher-order cog-
nition resulting in action output. These 
processes may be conceived as being more 
or less dynamically integrated. Perception 
may be thought to be an inferential proc-
ess as Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and 
more recent predictive models (e.g., Hohwy 
2013) would have it, where perception is 
constituted in top-down predictive process-
es (informed by generative models on what 
is typically considered the cognitive level), 
and, in some cases, active inference (when 
action is involved).
« 18 » For Jacob Hohwy (2016) and 
many others who champion Bayesian 
predictive coding, all such processing is 
brain-bound, tightly wrapped in a Mar-
kov blanket that strictly isolates the brain 
from body and world. Prediction-error 
minimization (PEM) in the brain does the 
important work; active inference (moving 
around the world) simply serves the central 
processes:
“ PEM should make us resist conceptions of [a 
mind-world] relation on which the mind is in 
some fundamental way open or porous to the 
world, or on which it is in some strong sense em-
bodied, extended or enactive. instead, PEM re-
veals the mind to be inferentially secluded from 
the world, it seems to be more neurocentrically 
skull-bound than embodied or extended, and 
action itself is more an inferential process on 
sensory input than an enactive coupling with the 
environment.” (Hohwy 2016: 259)
« 19 » in contrast to such internalist 
conceptions, phenomenology and enactive 
and extended EC approaches argue that 
perception should be understood as a set of 
dynamical processes that relate brain, body, 
and environment. inspired by Merleau-
Ponty, for example, enactivists argue that 
the body is involved in at least two ways in 
perception:
  Perception is closely tied to action, and 
thus partially constituted by sensorimo-
tor contingencies (di Paolo, Buhrmann 
& Barandiaran 2017; o’regan & noë 
2001; noë 2004), and
  Perception is shaped by bodily-affective 
processes (Colombetti 2014; Gallagher 
2017; Gallagher & Bower 2014; Thomp-
son & stapleton 2009).
in the case of sensorimotor contingencies, 
not only does motor control depend on per-
ceptual input, any movement of one’s body 
changes one’s perception. informed by de-
tailed sensorimotor contingencies, enac-
tive perception is often described in terms 
of affordances. in the phenomenological 
philosophers this idea can be traced back 
to Edmund Husserl’s (1989) notion of the 
“i can.” The idea is that i perceive the world 
in the pragmatic terms of what I can do, or 
in terms of my skill or my expertise. Percep-
tion is, as James Gibson (1977) argued, af-
fordance-based. an expert trained in archi-
tecture may perceive more affordances than 
the novice, or different ones; a city-dweller 
may see the surrounding city environment 
or a rural pasture differently from how a 
farmer would.
« 20 » Perception is shaped not only by 
pragmatic affordances related to sensory-
motor contingencies – the “i can” – but also 
by affective factors of embodiment. Even 
if i am skilled and capable of grabbing an 
object, i may not feel “up to the task,” or i 
may not feel motivated or interested. i may 
not see the object in precisely the same way 
as i would if i were interested, or if i were 
not so tired. There may be an affective cost 
that diminishes what an object affords. not 
only does one have a practical (sensorimo-
tor) apprehension of accessibility, but one 
also has an affective take on that same ac-
cessibility, in terms of interest or inclination 
to follow through or in terms of the ease or 
difficulty of acting.
« 21 » This affective dimension can be 
cashed out in terms of a more liberal pre-
dictive processing view where the priors or 
generative models are not reduced to brain-
bound processes but can include embod-
ied, affective components. Lisa Barrett and 
Moshe Bar (also see Barrett & simmons 
2015; Chanes & Barrett 2016), for example, 
have proposed the “affective prediction hy-
pothesis,” which
“ implies that responses signaling an object’s 
salience, relevance or value do not occur as a 
separate step after the object is identified. instead, 
affective responses support vision from the very 
moment that visual stimulation begins.” (Bar-
rett & Bar 2009: 1325)
« 22 »  This is not just a matter of inter-
nal processing in the brain, but includes a 
dynamical relation between brain and body. 
along with processing in the early visual 
area, for example, activation of the medial 
orbital frontal cortex (oFC) initiates a 
train of muscular and hormonal changes 
throughout the body. This generates in-
teroceptive feedback from organs, muscles, 
and joints associated with prior experience, 
which immediately integrates with current 
exteroceptive sensory input. This means 
that the organism as a whole is responding 
and contributing to perception.
“ The oFC’s ongoing integration of sensory in-
formation from the external world with that from 
the body indicates that conscious percepts are 
indeed intrinsically infused with affective value, 
so that the affective salience or significance of an 
object is not computed after the fact. […t]he pre-
dictions generated during object perception carry 
affective value as a necessary and normal part of 
visual experience. (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1328).
« 23 » Perception involves whole-body 
dispositions and adjustments and what Pat-
rick Freund et al. (2018) call “anatomically 
informed priors” (see also allen & Friston 
2018). This implies, first, that perception 
is not just action-oriented, or recognition-
oriented; it is also reward-oriented, hedonic, 
aesthetic, and affective in the broadest sense. 
second, it means that perceptual networks 
are dynamically connected to and deeply af-
fected by embodied processes that involve 
multiple systems, such as endocrine and au-
tonomic systems (Gallagher & allen 2018). 
Fatigue and hunger, for example, involve 
extra-neural processes that influence brain 
function and have an effect on perception. 
Homeostatic regulation depends on chemi-
cal influences in the endocrine system. in 
hypoglycemic conditions (which can slow or 
weaken brain function) perception is modu-
lated by complex chemical processes in the 
body-brain system as it couples with the en-
vironment.
« 24 » These considerations lead away 
from narrow, internalist conceptions of the 
mind, even in predictive processing (PP) 
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“ PP thus provides, or so i will argue, the per-
fect neuro-computational partner for recent work 
on the embodied mind – work that stresses the 
constant engagement of the world by cycles of 
perceptual-motor activity.” (Clark 2016: 1)
in contrast to Hohwy, who makes the “neu-
rocentrically skull-bound” generative model 
do most of the work, Clark (ibid: 133) em-
phasizes active inference–active, embodied 
engagement that manipulates the environ-
ment in order to reduce prediction errors. 
Enactivist interpretations of the predictive 
model move even more in that direction 
(allen & Friston 2018; Bitbol & Gallagher 
2018; Bruineberg, Kiverstein & rietveld 
2018; Gallagher & allen 2018; ramstead, 
Badcock & Friston 2018). as Karl Friston 
puts it:
“ We must here understand ‘model’ in the most 
inclusive sense, as combining interpretive dispo-
sitions, morphology, and neural architecture, and 
as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, 
embodied organism and the embedded environ-
ment.” (Friston et al. 2012: 6)
« 25 » as Friston (2013: 213) summa-
rizes, “an agent does not have a model of its 
world – it is a model.” With this it is not clear 
that we still need to think of the brain as re-
quiring its own model of the world, or even 
that we need to keep the concept of a model. 
rather than a generative model, which im-
plies an additional internal dynamics sepa-
rate from bodily and environmental pro-
cesses, we can refer to a generative dynamics 
coordinated across brain, body and environ-
ment. to develop a conception of enactive 
perception, we need to understand active 
inference in terms of action rather than pre-
diction error minimization (see Bruineberg, 
Kiverstein & rietveld 2018).
action, agency, and 
autonomy
« 26 » The well-known experiments 
by Benjamin Libet (1985, 1992) suggested 
that if free will does exist it is to be found 
in processes that span the 150 milliseconds 
of neuronal activation occurring just prior 
to issue of a motor command. Libet showed 
that we become conscious of the decision or 
urge to move only after some 500–850 mil-
liseconds of brain activity (the “readiness 
potential,” which correlates with prepara-
tion for that specific action) have already 
occurred. This suggests that consciousness 
does not play a role in causing the action, 
at least until approximately 150 milliseconds 
before motor activation. We should note two 
things about this result. First, this has noth-
ing to do with free will. i have argued that 
Libet’s experiments were about motor con-
trol processes that typically remain uncon-
scious, and that free will involves larger tim-
escales and factors that cannot be reduced 
to neuronal processes. i will return to this 
point. second, 150 milliseconds of neuronal 
activation in pre-motor processes is plenty 
of time to generate a sense of agency that is 
experienced, pre-reflectively, as intrinsic to 
one’s action. This has been a standard way to 
think about the sense of agency (Haggard & 
Magno 1999; Haggard & Eimer 1999; Gal-
lagher 2000) – as something that anticipates 
the action itself generated in neuronal pro-
cesses that just precede motor command.
« 27 » The sense of agency, however, 
is more complex than just this experi-
ence of motor control. it also includes a 
sense of what one is doing in the world – a 
sense of what one’s action is accomplish-
ing (Gallagher 2012; Haggard 2017). Even 
more than this, one’s experience of agency 
depends on a variety of factors that go be-
yond physical bodily action or its immedi-
ate intentional aspect. it may include the 
scope of affordances available to the agent 
in specific environments; it can also include 
prior intention formation that may benefit 
from communications with other people, 
as well as retrospective attribution that may 
take shape in narrative. action is always 
situated in physical, social and cultural cir-
cumstances. importantly, other people and 
social forces have an effect on one’s sense of 
agency. Even on the pre-reflective level, the 
presence of others can have an effect on my 
perception of action possibilities. an agent 
may be both capable of and proficient at per-
forming action a, for example, throwing a 
basketball through a hoop. nonetheless her 
performance, and her sense of agency, may 
be negatively affected simply by the fact that 
there is an audience of basketball superstars 
watching her. she may in fact feel a degree 
of inadequacy in such circumstances, simply 
because a specific set of people are present. 
Likewise, and in contrast to many analyses 
of agency in philosophy of mind and the 
cognitive sciences, deliberation, intention 
formation and motivation to act are not 
simply mental states in one’s head, or causal 
brain states. rather, they are often processes 
or states co-constituted with others in pro-
cesses of communication. Consider also the 
effects of peer pressure, implicit or explicit 
social referencing, or one’s habitual behavior 
in the presence of others. such phenomena 
may detract from or increase one’s feeling 
of agency and ability to act. it is also the 
case that specific types of long-standing so-
cial arrangements, such as apartheid, can 
have prolonged effects on a person’s (or a 
people’s) long-term sense of agency, essen-
tially robbing them of possibilities for action 
(Gallagher 2012).
« 28 » returning to the question of free 
will, i have argued that we should not think 
of the exercise of free will as equivalent to 
the initiation and control of bodily move-
ment (mental causation), which is the target 
of the Libet experiments, and the standard 
way of thinking of free will from descartes 
to many contemporary philosophers and 
neuroscientists (Gallagher 2006). Motor 
control, the body-schematic details of which 
we are not usually conscious, is not the same 
thing as the exercise of free will. The con-
sciousness that pertains to action is not (as 
in the Libet experiments) focused on decid-
ing to move one’s body. rather, awareness of 
bodily movement is typically minimal and 
recessive.
« 29 » Given the prevalence of the tra-
ditional conception of free will (as involv-
ing mental causation of bodily movement), 
it may be productive to shift to the concept 
of autonomy. The notion of autonomy, at 
least, is not associated with abstract motor 
processes that make up intentional actions; 
it applies to an engaged, situated agent and 
intentional actions themselves, described at 
an appropriate pragmatic level of descrip-
tion. immanuel Kant (1996) is the locus 
classicus for the traditional conception of 
autonomy, which involves self-sufficiency, 
self-legislation, or self-determination. Fol-
lowing this tradition, most contemporary 
discussions of autonomy take it to be an 
individualistic concept. Harry Frankfurt 
(1982), for example, frames it in terms of ra-
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tional-reflective decision-making processes 
– a deliberation leading to the formation of 
second-order intentions or desires. other 
theorists take narrative competency to be 
an important part of the precise kind of 
self-reflection that informs decision-mak-
ing. david velleman (2005), for example, 
argues that narrative-based reflection pro-
vides a framework for forming and testing 
one’s intentions and for guiding actions and 
the formation of self-identity. This allows 
for autonomous self-governance, which de-
pends on forming intentions that are con-
sistent with one’s narrative understanding 
of oneself.
« 30 » Embodied action, however, hap-
pens in a world that is not only physical but 
also social. our actions and our decisions 
often involve other people; they are often 
joint actions steered by physical and so-
cial forces and affordances. in this respect, 
autonomy is relational (Christman 2004; 
Mackenzie & stoljar 2000). in contrast to 
traditional models of an autonomous in-
dividual, Catriona Mackenzie and natalie 
stoljar (2000: 4) suggest that we think of 
autonomy “as a characteristic of agents who 
are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, 
and feeling, as well as rational, creatures.” 
indeed, our deliberations, and our inten-
tions may be formulated in communicative 
practices, and may not be reducible to pro-
cesses that are exclusive to one individual. 
in that sense they may be co-constituted in 
one’s interactions with others. They may be 
shaped by institutional forces, social prac-
tices, and normative expectations. accord-
ingly, autonomy is a matter of degree, some-
thing that is enhanced or reduced by various 
physical, social, economic, cultural factors, 
our relations with others, as well as our own 
narrative practices. individuals are always 
embedded in social contexts, characterized 
by intersubjective and normative relations 
that can either enhance or impoverish the 
control they have over their lives and can 
expand or constrict their action possibili-
ties. For this reason, it is best to conceive of 
agency, intention, and autonomy in these 
embodied and socially situated terms, rather 
than in terms of brain processes measured 
in milliseconds.
« 31 » autonomy, as i mentioned, is 
closely connected to notions of self-determi-
nation, self-legislation, and self-sufficiency, 
and even if these are understood in relation-
al terms, it refers us directly to some concept 
of self. to understand action and agency we 
need to understand the agent, and precisely 
what it is that constitutes the agent.
self
« 32 » There is a long tradition of look-
ing for the self in the brain. Even those who 
would deny that the self is reducible to brain 
processes consider the self to have a special 
relation to the brain. Karl Popper and John 
Eccles (1977), for example, defend a dualism 
that takes the self to be an autonomous entity 
that significantly interacts with and controls 
neural processes. “The self-conscious mind 
acts upon […] neural centres, modifying 
the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the 
neural events” (Popper & Eccles 1977: 495).
« 33 » There is still great interest in how 
various aspects of self relate to brain, or how 
specific brain areas correlate with self-relat-
ed phenomena. self-referential processes, 
including autobiographical knowledge, per-
sonal beliefs, self-conceptions, and face self-
recognition are related to left hemisphere 
activity (turk et al. 2003; see also Kircher et 
al. 2000) or right frontal cortex (Platek et al. 
2003), or right lateral parietal cortex (Lou et 
al. 2004) or medial prefrontal cortex bilater-
ally (Fossati et al. 2003). Moreover, cortical 
midline structures (CMs) process informa-
tion related to self when subjects reflectively 
think about themselves, or when they make 
judgments about their own personalities 
(d’argembeau et al. 2007; Gutchess et al. 
2007; northoff & Bermpohl 2004; northoff 
et al. 2006; ruby et al. 2009). northoff con-
tends that the CMs includes a unitary neu-
ral network responsible for all self-related 
phenomena (northoff et al. 2006). The CMs 
also connects to subcortical areas, suggest-
ing a relation to an embodied self (northoff 
& Panksepp 2008).
« 34 » Given the diversity and large 
number of cortical areas correlated with 
self-reference, seth Gillihan and Martha 
Farah (2005) were led to suggest that there 
is no specialized brain area responsible for 
generating “the self.” dorothée Legrand and 
Perrine ruby (2009) argue in a complemen-
tary way that no area of the brain is exclu-
sively self-specific since “every significant 
activation in the [self condition] was also 
found in either the [other person condi-
tion] or the [general semantic] condition, or 
both” (Craik et al. 1999: 30; also Gillihan & 
Farah 2005: 94). it thus seems right to say 
that the self is both everywhere and nowhere 
in the brain (vogeley & Gallagher 2011). it 
is not just that the brain is so complex, how-
ever, but also that the concept of self is am-
biguous. accordingly, in any analysis of self 
we need to define the precise aspect of the 
self under study. selves consist of a variety 
of aspects – experiential, ecological, agen-
tive – and are capable of various forms of 
self-recognition, self-related cognition, self-
narrative, and self-specific perception and 
action. in this respect, selves are more “in-
the-world” than “in-the-brain” (vogeley & 
Gallagher 2011: 129).
« 35 » in contrast to theories that would 
reduce the self to one particular type of 
thing – for example, a self-model gener-
ated by neuronal processes, and nothing 
more (e.g., Metzinger 2004); or the abstract 
product of narratives, and nothing more 
(e.g., dennett 1991); or nothing more than 
a 3-second-long experience sans body or 
agency or narrative (strawson 1999) – plu-
ralist theories suggest that the self is many 
things. William James (1950), for example, 
distinguished between physical, social, and 
private selves. ulrich neisser (1988) distin-
guished ecological, interpersonal, concep-
tual, extended, and private selves. in an at-
tempt to capture the plurality of self-related 
factors and the idea that the agentive self is 
more “in-the-world” than “in the brain,” i 
have proposed a pattern theory of self (Gal-
lagher 2013b). in brief, the pattern theory of 
self (Pts) argues that a self is constituted as 
a pattern or dynamical Gestalt comprised of 
a sufficient number of characteristic factors, 
including embodied, experiential, affective, 
behavioral, intersubjective, psychological/
cognitive, reflective, narrative, extended 
and normative factors (see table  1). it is 
important to note that this is not an addi-
tive list of factors; rather these components 
or aspects are dynamically interrelated in a 
pattern or Gestalt arrangement (Gallagher 
& daly 2018). accordingly, a change in one 
element, above a certain threshold, will lead, 
via dynamical interactions, to changes in 
others. For example, as suggested above, as-
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agency, can be modulated by other complex, 
relational aspects, such as social, normative 
factors that involve culture, gender, race, 
health, etc., and by specific intersubjective 
factors that can either diminish or enhance 
one’s autonomy and sense of agency. There 
is much more to say about Pts and about 
how to investigate the dynamical aspects of 
the self-pattern (see Gallagher & daly 2018). 
Here, however, my intention is simply to 
note that a self-pattern is more than a neural 
pattern. This does not mean that there is no 
connection between self and brain. indeed, 
changes in neurophysiology can “index” 
changes in the self-pattern (Fingelkurts & 
Fingelkurts 2017).
« 36 » Within the framework of predic-
tive processing (PP), Jakub Limanowski and 
Felix Blankenburg (2013: 1), for example, 
argue that the minimal (pre-reflective) ex-
periential aspects of the bodily self can be 
“mapped onto a hierarchical generative 
model […] and may constitute the basis 
for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-re-
ferral.” on the same model affective factors 
may involve multisensory integration (seth 
2013) that also relate to self-recognition 
(apps & tsakiris 2014). Matthew apps and 
Manos tsakiris also note the influence of 
culturally shaped priors on PP:
“ There is also evidence of more long-term con-
textual influences on self-recognition related 
priors, highlighted by the role that cultural and 
societal effects have on self-other decision-mak-
ing. For instance, self-other face recognition has 
been shown to be different across cultures […].” 
(ibid: 14)
once again, these dynamical neural and 
extra-neural integrations reflect the various 
dynamical relations between the embodied 
and experiential aspects of the self-pattern 
and the extended and normative aspects. to 
paraphrase Friston, the agent does not have 
a self, it is a self, where the self is not a model 
in the brain but a pattern of generative dy-
namics coordinated across the elements of 
brain, body and environment.
« 37 » importantly, on a PP approach, 
self-specific neural processing may arise in 
any multisensory processing, thereby avoid-
ing problems (outlined above) involved in 
positing specialized circuits or parts of the 
brain that are self-specific. indeed, apps and 
elements of the pattern Brief description
Embodied elements
Core biological, ecological and interoceptive factors, allowing the 
system to distinguish between itself and what is not itself – 
extremely basic to all kinds of animal behavior.
Minimal experiential 
elements
First-person, pre-reflective, conscious experience, reflecting the self/
non-self distinction, manifest in various sensory-motor modalities 
(kinaesthesia, proprioception, touch, vision, etc.) – including a sense of 
ownership (the “mineness” of one’s experience) and a sense of agency 
for one’s actions (Gallagher 2012; Rochat 2011).
Affective aspects
Affect/emotion/temperament, ranging from bodily affects to what may 
be a typical affective or emotion pattern (Newen, Welpinghus & Juckel 
2015).
Behavioral aspects
Behaviors and actions make us who we are – behavioral habits 
reflect, and perhaps actually constitute, our character. This is a 




Human are born with a capacity for attuning to intersubjective 
existence, which develops into a social self-consciousness – a self-for-
others (Mead 1913), manifested behaviorally in mirror self-recognition 




Traditional theories of the self focus on these factors, which may 
range from explicit self-consciousness to a conceptual understanding 
of self as self, to personality traits of which one may not be self-
conscious at all – psychological continuity and the importance of 
memory are highlighted in the literature on personal identity.
Reflective capacities
The ability to reflect on one’s experiences and actions –  closely 
related to the notions of autonomy and moral personhood, including 
the capacity to reflect and form second-order volitions about one’s 
desires (Frankfurt 1982; Taylor 1989).
Narrative capacities
Although some theorists make the strong claim that narratives are 
constitutive for selves (Schechtman 2011), for PTS one can lose the 
ability to construct a self-narrative (as in cases of dysnarrativa) and 




Including the possibilities presented by physical pieces of property, 
and various things that we own (James 1950). Not only may we 
identify with our material belongings, o r  the technologies we use, 
our professions and the institutions we work in, but we are also 
dynamically related to the action possibilities they afford.
Normative factors
Ranging across possibilities presented by the kind of family structure 
and situation in which we grew up to cultural and normative practices, 
involving physical and mental health, gender, race, and economic 
status, that define our way of living.
Table 1 • Dynamical aspects of the self-pattern (from Gallagher & Daly 2018).
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tsakiris (2014: 8) claim that a PP account 
“provides flexibility, with fewer constraints 
on what types of information can drive self-
recognition.” The strong claim is that pre-
dictive models can explain all of the various 
factors that contribute to the self-pattern. as 
they note,
“ This is particularly important, given the evi-
dence to suggest that the continuity of the self 
may be underpinned by many different types of 
information, the integration of which leads to a 
coherent sense of one’s body.” (ibid: 9)
« 38 » to be clear, this type of analysis 
sends us back to issues previously discussed 
(in the section on perception) about how 
we might best interpret predictive process-
ing models. although Hohwy and John Mi-
chael (2017) build an internalist PP model 
of self, it is interesting to note that they 
see their account as consistent with PP ac-
counts of minimal phenomenal (experien-
tial) selfhood, or self model (Limanowski & 
Blankenburg 2013; Metzinger 2004), bodily 
self-awareness (apps & tsakiris 2014), in-
teroceptive aspects (seth, suzuki & Critchley 
2011), intersubjective aspects that relate self 
and other (Moutoussis et al. 2014), social un-
derstanding of self and other (Frith & Friston 
2015), and psychodynamical notions of self 
(e.g., Fotopoulou 2012), thereby touching on 
many elements of the self-pattern. all of this, 
however, on their account, is reducible to the 
brain’s predictive model. rather than taking 
the fully embodied self to be the agent of ac-
tive inference, or part of a dynamical system 
that includes the brain, Hohwy and Michael 
take the body to be a representation in the 
internal model of the agent:
“ The body is nothing special, it is just one 
among many causes interacting with each other 
in the environment, and in the course of this im-
pacting on the senses. representation of the body 
is nothing special either; it is just one among 
many causes that get represented in the internal 
model used for prediction error minimization.” 
(Hohwy & Michael 2017: 367f)
« 39 » in contrast to reducing the self 
to neuronal patterns, or to the patterns of 
inference that constitute a self-model, Pts 
argues that the self-pattern is a “real pat-
tern” (dennett 1991) of dynamical relations 
among brain-body-environment (broadly 
speaking). such dynamical relations may be 
partially indexed or traced by neuronal pro-
cesses to the extent that the latter partially 
underpin various factors of the self-pattern, 
but they are not reducible to such processes. 
one important component of this pattern 
includes the agent’s intersubjective inter-
actions and capacities for social cognition, 
phenomena that are clearly more than just 
brain processes.
social cognition
« 40 » standard approaches to social 
cognition (theory of mind – toM) typically 
accept the assumption of methodologi-
cal individualism. although toM seeks to 
explain how we understand the minds of 
others, via mindreading processes, all those 
processes are said to be contained in the 
observer’s own head/brain. Either a theory 
of mind module (toMM) in pre-frontal 
areas activates subpersonal processes that 
constitute a “tacit theory” or implicit use of 
folk psychology (Carruthers 2015), or mir-
ror neurons generate subpersonal processes 
that simulate the actions and minds of oth-
ers (Gallese 2001; Goldman 2006).
« 41 » The alternative phenomenolog-
ical-enactive approach to social cognition, 
interaction theory (it), rejects the idea that 
we mindread the hidden mental states of 
others. it focuses on embodied interaction 
processes that draw on multiple semiotic 
resources in the other’s postures, move-
ments, gestures, facial expressions, vocal 
intonations, communicative practices and 
actions in contextualized social and cul-
tural environments. This includes an enac-
tive model of direct social perception of the 
other person’s embodied mental states (es-
pecially intentions and emotions) (de Jae-
gher, di Paolo & Gallagher 2010; Gallagher 
2005, 2008a; reddy 2008). For example, if 
emotional episodes, as Giovanna Colom-
betti suggests:
“ correspond to specific self-organizing forms 
or second-order constraints – emotion forms, as 
i call them – that recruit or entrain various pro-
cesses (neural, muscular, autonomic, etc.) into 
highly integrated configurations or patterns.” 
(Colombetti 2014: 69)
and if these patterns include bodily expres-
sions, comportments, and actions, then 
(consistent with what we said in previous 
sections) my perception of another per-
son’s emotions may be considered a form 
of perceptual pattern recognition – one that 
is action- (or interaction-) oriented and 
takes that pattern as a social affordance for 
further response on my part. on this view 
we are not engaged in third-person obser-
vation of others, but in second-person (“i-
thou” or “we-mode”) interactions. in con-
trast to methodological individualism, what 
does the work of social cognition are not 
mechanisms internal to the individual, but 
our engaged interactions that happen in our 
shared, intersubjective world and that build 
on shared or reciprocal social affordances.
« 42 » scientific evidence for this is 
found in developmental studies of infants, 
from birth onward, in their face-to-face, 
primary intersubjective relations, and their 
pragmatically contextualized secondary in-
tersubjective relations (trevarthen 1979). 
Primary intersubjectivity involves innate or 
early-developing sensory-motor capacities 
that bring us into relation with others and 
allow us to interact with them. in part, these 
capacities involve action and perceptual ex-
perience – we are able to see or more gen-
erally perceive in the other person’s bodily 
postures, movements, gestures, facial ex-
pressions, gaze direction, vocal intonation, 
etc. what they intend and what they feel. 
We respond with our own bodily move-
ments, gestures, facial expressions, gaze, etc. 
on this view, the other’s mind is in her em-
bodied comportment, and manifests itself 
in second-person interactions. For infants, 
these highly embodied and situated interac-
tions form the basis for a developing under-
standing of others.
« 43 » infants already have a sense, from 
their own self-movement and propriocep-
tion, of their own agency, and they see this 
kind of agency in others. They respond, 
interactively, to certain kinds of entities 
(specifically to other agents) in the environ-
ment. They can respond in a distinctive way 
to human faces (Johnson 2000; Johnson, 
slaughter & Carey 1998; Legerstee 1991), for 
example. From birth infants are capable of 
perceiving and responding to facial gestures 
presented by others, and seem to be directly 
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humans (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1994; Gal-
lagher & Meltzoff 1996). although claims 
about neonatal imitation remain controver-
sial, this is not a worry for it. Whether it is 
differential imitation or a mere arousal re-
sponse (anisfeld 2005; Keven & akins 2017; 
Jones 2006, 2009; but see nagy et al. 2013; 
nagy, Pal & orvos 2014; vincini et al. 2017a, 
2017b; vincini & Jhang 2018) it nonetheless 
leads infant and caregiver to intersubjec-
tive interaction. an initial adult facial ges-
ture may motivate the infant’s arousal and 
response; in turn the infant’s response has 
an effect on the adult who is encouraged to 
continue with facial games, etc. in this way, 
even a mere arousal response could facilitate 
early social interaction.
« 44 » Primary intersubjectivity can be 
specified in much more detail. at 2 months, 
infants are already attuned to the other per-
son’s attention; they follow the other’s head 
movements and gaze (Baron-Cohen 1995; 
Maurer & Barrera 1981). also at 2 months, 
second-person interaction is evidenced by 
the timing and emotional response of in-
fants’ behavior (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). 
This is part of a mutual attunement that 
characterizes interactions and that can be 
specified in detail in their dynamical rela-
tions and the integration of the intrinsic 
temporalities of the agents’ movements 
(trevarthen 1999; trevarthen et al. 2006). 
at 5–7 months infants can detect visual-
audio correspondences specifying the ex-
pression of emotions (Walker 1982; Hobson 
1993, 2002). at 6 months they see grasping 
as goal-directed. at 10–11 months infants 
can parse intentional boundaries within 
some kinds of continuous action (Baldwin 
& Baird 2001; Baird & Baldwin 2001; Wood-
ward & sommerville 2000).
« 45 » such expressions, intonations, 
gestures, and movements do not float freely 
in the air; they are situated in the world, 
anchored to specific contexts. accordingly, 
towards the end of the first year, infants start 
to notice how others engage with the world. 
For joint attention and secondary intersub-
jectivity context becomes very important, 
and it helps us to intersubjectively co-con-
stitute the meaning of the world.
« 46 » a good example of secondary in-
tersubjectivity can be found in conversation 
analysis, the rich analysis of speech acts situ-
ated in circumstances that involve our own 
and others’ postures and movements, along 
with environmental arrangements and af-
fordances (Goodwin 2000, 2017). Charles 
Goodwin shows that meaning emerges 
in action and interaction, specifically at 
the intersection of social, cultural, mate-
rial and temporal structures of the environ-
ment. Meaning is accomplished, not just via 
speech but by drawing on “different kinds 
of semiotic resources” available in the en-
vironment and in whole-body pragmatics. 
“For example, spoken language builds signs 
within the stream of speech, gestures use the 
body in a particular way, while posture and 
orientation use the body in another, etc.” 
Goodwin emphasizes the “visible, public 
deployment of multiple semiotic fields that 
mutually elaborate each other” (ibid: 1494): 
vocal intonations (some of which have a de-
ontic rather than descriptive force); move-
ments, postures and bodily orientations; 
instituted norms; references to completed 
actions; interruption of activities, and so on.
« 47 » as an example, Goodwin pro-
vides a detailed analysis of a dispute between 
two young girls over a game of hopscotch.
“ unlike talk, gestures can’t be heard. [This 
means] Carla [one of the girls] actively works to 
position her hand gestures so that they will be 
perceived by diana [the other girl] […] Carla’s 
hand is explicitly positioned in diana’s line of 
sight […] thrusting the gesturing hand toward 
diana’s face twists Carla’s body into a configura-
tion in which her hand, arm and the upper part 
of her torso are actually leaning toward diana.” 
(Goodwin 2001: 1498)
« 48 » The proximity of the gesture to 
the other girl’s face has meaning. if it were 
a touch rather than a gesture, how hard or 
soft, and where the touch occurred would 
also have meaning.
« 49 » importantly, interaction is not 
one-sided. a response draws a further re-
sponse. in the interaction, the conversation 
is not confined to vocalization and gesture 
– reference is made to the surrounding en-
vironment, joint attention is established and 
then broken and then re-established. The 
accomplishment of meaning is not under 
the control of just one individual; rather it 
depends upon two-way interaction. ac-
cording to it, social understanding builds 
on precisely this complex integration of pri-
mary and secondary intersubjective capaci-
ties, situated within pragmatic and social 
contexts, supplemented with and support-
ing communicative and narrative processes. 
in this regard, it is the interaction itself that 
contributes something not reducible to the 
actions of the individuals involved, or to in-
dividual brain states (de Jaegher, di Paolo & 
Gallagher 2010).
« 50 » it does not deny that the brain is 
an important part of the body or that it plays 
an important role in cognition and social 
cognition. indeed, mirror neurons, motor 
control processes, and notions of reuse may 
play some role in explaining social cogni-
tion. it is reasonable to think that reuse is 
in some way constrained by original use. if 
so, then the fact that our perceptual-motor 
systems were originally designed for action, 
rather than for observation, is significant 
(anderson & Chemero 2017). it is likely that 
this action orientation carries through to 
the reuse of our motor systems in contexts 
of social cognition, but again (as i indicated 
in §§13–14) this requires a reinterpretation 
of reuse in relation to wider contexts involv-
ing metaplasticity. Thus, i see your action as 
an affordance that motivates my own action 
– i see it as something i can respond to in 
broader contexts of social interactions, joint 
actions, cultural practices, etc., and that is 
precisely how i understand your action.
« 51 » The interaction that is essential 
to social cognition is not reducible to the 
interaction of neurons; it requires agentive 
bodies, and others, situated in physical, so-
cial, cultural and normatively constrained 
environments in support of interactions that 
happen in the world rather than in individ-
ual brains.
conclusion
« 52 » since the 1990s, the assumption 
in cognitive science has been that neurosci-
ence will at some point replace psychology 
and that we will adjust our philosophies of 
mind accordingly (Gazzaniga 1998). The 
expectation was that the best explanation of 
brain function would be worked out in the 
vocabulary of neuroscience. in contrast, i 
want to suggest that the best explanation of 
brain function may be found in the vocabu-
laries of embodied and situated cognition, 
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developmental psychology, ecological psy-
chology, dynamic systems theory, applied 
linguistics, the theory of affordances, along 
with the anthropological insights found in 
discussions that extend from concepts of 
cultural niche to material engagement. There 
is a methodological question involved here: 
whether neuroscience can start to speak this 
different language and enter into the right 
kind of dialogue. There is also a substantial 
question: how do brains operate in the com-
plex and dynamical mix of interactions that 
involve perceiving, moving, gesturing, act-
ing, emoting and expressing bodies?
“ it is conventional to think of the nervous sys-
tem as an organ that monitors and motivates the 
body rather than an organ controlled by the body 
[…]. nevertheless, the body’s influence on the 
nervous system is as important for the organ-
ism as is neural dominion over the body. (Purves 
1988: 1)
« 53 » That the body essentially con-
strains and “pushes” the organization of the 
brain through its dynamic behavioral inter-
action with the environment was already 
well documented by George Coghill (1929), 
in Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his 1957–58 lec-
tures on the concept of nature, was inspired 
by Coghill’s work for setting the principles 
of dynamic anatomy in opposition to strict 
determinism, and he provides an appropri-
ate conclusion.
“ The nervous system emerges from a preneural 
dynamic. Thus when the nervous excitation occurs, 
it can’t play an important role in the organization 
of the nervous system. This organization is not so 
much due to the functioning of the neuron as to the 
growth of the total organism. The preneural system 
of integration ‘strides across’ the nervous function-
ing and it doesn’t stop when it appears. so the ner-
vous system can’t be the ultimate explanation. Then 
we must admit an intrinsic potentiality of growth, 
a dynamic system reacting to its surroundings as 
an organism would do. it replaces the function of 
conduction as being a consequence, not a principle 
of the system.” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 192)
« 54 » in this article i have considered 
a sampling of research areas in the cogni-
tive sciences – perception, agency, self and 
social cognition. in each case i have argued 
against a narrow or neurocentric reduc-
tionism. These are basic phenomena upon 
which many cognitive capacities are built. 
one could easily see the same principles 
at work in a number of other areas where 
more comprehensive accounts have been 
developed by taking embodied, ecological, 
enactive and extended approaches seri-
ously – for example, research on memory 
(sutton 2010), expert performance (Høffd-
ing 2015; ilundáin-agurruza 2016), collec-
tive intentionality (tollefsen & Gallagher 
2017), psychopathology (Gallagher 2013c), 
and psychotherapy (Garcia & di Paolo 2018; 
röhricht et al. 2014). in each case one can 
acknowledge the importance of what the 
brain is doing, operating as part of a larger 
circuit that includes body and environment. 
The brain is not at the center of a circle with 
radii of control extending to other elements; 
it is one component arranged in the circuit, 
or in what viktor von Weizsäcker (1986) 
called a Gestalt circle of brain, body, and the 
(physical, social, cultural) environment.
acknowledgements
research for this article was supported 
by the Humboldt Foundation’s anneliese 
Maier research award and the australian 
research Council (arC) grant, Minds in 
Skilled Performance. dP170102987. i ben-
efitted greatly from the comments of two 
blind, but insightful reviewers.
References
Allen M. & Friston K. J. (2018) From cogni-
tivism to autopoiesis: towards a com-
putational framework for the embodied 
mind. synthese 195(6): 2459–2482. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4099
Anderson M. L. (2010) neural reuse: a funda-
mental reorganizing principle of the brain. 
Behavioral and Brain sciences 33: 245–266.
Anderson M. & Chemero A. (2017) The brain 
evolved to guide action. in: shepherd s. v. 
(ed.) The Wiley handbook of evolutionary 
neuroscience John Wiley, new York: 1–20.
shaun gallagheR
is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University 
of Memphis. His areas of research include phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 
especially topics related to embodiment, self, agency and intersubjectivity. Gallagher 
holds a secondary research appointment at the University of Wollongong, Australia, 
and is Honorary Professor of Health Science at the University of Tromsø, Norway. He 
has held visiting positions at Cambridge; Copenhagen; the Ecole Normale Supériure, 
Paris and Lyon; the Humboldt University in Berlin, and most recently at Keble 
College, University of Oxford. Professor Gallagher received the Humboldt Foundation’s 
Anneliese Maier Research Award (2012–18). His publications include How the Body 
Shapes the Mind (2005), The Phenomenological Mind (with Dan Zahavi, 2008, 






















 ConstruCtivist Foundations vol. 14, n°1
Andler D. (2016) La silhouette de l’humain. 
Quelle place pour le naturalisme dans le 
monde d’aujourd’hui? Editions Gallimard, 
Paris.
Anisfeld M. (2005) no compelling evidence to 
dispute Piaget’s timetable of the develop-
ment of representational imitation in 
infancy. in: rizzolatti G., Hurley s. & Chater 
n. (eds.) Perspectives on imitation: From 
neuroscience to social science. Mit Press, 
Cambridge Ma: 107–131.
Apps M. A. & Tsakiris M. (2014) The free-
energy self: a predictive coding account of 
self-recognition. neuroscience & Biobehav-
ioral reviews 41: 85–97.
Baird J. A. & Baldwin D. A. (2001) Making 
sense of human behavior: action parsing 
and intentional inference. in: Malle B. F., 
Moses L. J. & Baldwin d. a. (eds.) inten-
tions and intentionality: Foundations of so-
cial cognition. Mit Press, Cambridge Ma.
Baldwin D. A. & Baird J. A. (2001) discerning 
intentions in dynamic human action. trends 
in Cognitive science 5(4): 171–78.
Baron-Cohen S. (1995) Mindblindness: an 
essay on autism and theory of mind. Mit 
Press, Cambridge Ma.
Barrett L. F. & Bar M. (2009) see it with feeling: 
affective predictions during object percep-
tion. Philosophical transactions of the 
royal society B 364(1521): 1325–1334.
Barrett L. F. & Simmons W. K. (2015) intero-
ceptive predictions in the brain. nature 
reviews neuroscience 16(7): 419–429.
Barsalou L. W. (2008) Grounding cognition. 
annual review of Psychology 59: 617–645.
Bedny M. & Caramazza A. (2011) Perception, 
action and word meanings in the human 
brain: The case from action verbs. annals 
of the new York academy of sciences 1224: 
81–95.
Berlucchi G. & Aglioti S. M. (2010) The body 
in the brain revisited. Experimental brain 
research 200(1): 25.
Binkofski F. & Buccino G. (2004) Motor 
functions of the Broca’s region. Brain and 
language 89(2): 362–369.
Bitbol M. & Gallagher S. (2018) autopoi-
esis and the free energy principle. Com-
ment on ramsted, Badcock and Fris-
ton. Physics of Life review 24: 24–26. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/5407
Blakemore S.-J. & Frith U. (2005) The learning 
brain: Lessons for education. Blackwell 
Publishing, Malden.
Broca P. (1861) remarks on the seat of the 
faculty of articulated language, following an 
observation of aphemia (loss of speech) Bul-
letin de la société anatomique 6: 330–357.
Bruineberg J., Kiverstein J. & Rietveld E. (2018) 
The anticipating brain is not a scientist: The 
free-energy principle from an ecological-
enactive perspective. synthese 195(6): 
2417–2444. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4497
Carruthers P. (2015) Perceiving mental states. 
Consciousness and Cognition 36: 498–507.
Chanes L. & Barrett L. F. (2016) redefining the 
role of limbic areas in cortical processing. 
trends in Cognitive sciences 20(2): 96–106.
Christman J. (2004) relational autonomy, lib-
eral individualism, and the social constitu-
tion of selves. Philosophical studies 117(1): 
143–164.
Clark A. (2016) surfing uncertainty: Prediction, 
action and the embodied mind. oxford 
university Press, oxford.
Coghill G. E. (1929) anatomy and the problem 
of behaviour. Cambridge university Press, 
Cambridge Ma.
Colombetti G. (2014) The feeling body: affec-
tive science meets the enactive mind. Mit 
Press, Cambridge Ma.
Craik F. I. M., Moroz T. M., Moscovitch M., 
Stuss D. T., Winocur G., Tulving E. & 
Kapur S. (1999) in search of the self: a 
positron emission tomography study. Psy-
chological science 10: 26–34.
Crick F. (1994) The astonishing hypothesis: 
The scientific search for the soul. Charles 
scribner’s sons, new York.
De Jaegher H., Di Paolo E. & Gallagher S. 
(2010) does social interaction constitute so-
cial cognition? trends in Cognitive sciences 
14(10): 441–447. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4349
Dehaene S. (2005) Evolution of human corti-
cal circuits for reading and arithmetic: 
The “neuronal recycling” hypothesis. in: 
dehaene s., duhamel J.-r., Hauser M. d. & 
rizzolatti G. (eds.) From monkey brain to 
human brain. Mit Press, Cambridge Ma: 
131–157.
Dennett D. C. (1991) Consciousness explained. 
Little, Brown & Co, new York.
Di Paolo E., Buhrmann T. & Barandiaran X. 
(2017) sensorimotor life: an enactive pro-
posal. oxford university Press, oxford.
Di Paolo E. A. & De Jaegher H. (2012) 
The interactive brain hypothesis. Fron-
tiers in human neuroscience 6:163. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/761
D’Argembeau A., Ruby P., Collette F., Deguel-
dre C., Balteau E., Luxen A., Maquet P. & 
Salmon E. (2007) distinct regions of the 
medial prefrontal cortex are associated with 
self-referential processing and perspective-
taking. Journal of Cognitive neuroscience 
19: 935–944.
Fingelkurts A. A. & Fingelkurts A. A. (2017) 
Three-dimensional components of selfhood 
in treatment-naive patients with major 
depressive disorder: a resting-state qEEG 
imaging study. neuropsychologia 99: 30–36.
Fossati P., Hevenor S. J., Graham S. J., Grady 
C., Keightley M. L., Craik F. & Mayberg 
H. (2003) in search of the emotional self: 
an fMri study using positive and negative 
emotional words. american Journal of 
Psychiatry 160: 1938–1945.
Fotopoulou A. (2012) towards psychodynamic 
neuroscience. in: Fotopoulou a., Conway 
M. & Pfaff d. (eds.) From the couch to the 
lab: trends in psychodynamic neuroscience. 
oxford university Press, new York: 25–47.
Frankfurt H. (1982) The importance of what we 
care about. synthese 53(2): 257–272.
Freund P., Friston K., Thompson A. J., Stephan 
K. E., Ashburner J., Bach D. R., Nagy Z., 
Helms G., Draganski B., Mohammadi 
S., Schwab M. E., Curt A. & Weiskopf N. 
(2018) Embodied neurology: an integrative 
framework for neurological disorders. Brain 
139(6): 1855–1861.
Friston K., Adams R. A., Perrinet L. & Break-
spear M. (2012) Perceptions as hypotheses: 
saccades as experiments. Frontiers in 
Psychology 3: 151.
Frith C. & Friston K. (2015) a duet for one. 
Consciousness and Cognition 36: 390–405.
Fuchs T. (2018) Ecology of the brain: The phe-
nomenology and biology of the embodied 
mind. oxford: oxford university Press.
Gallagher S. (2000) Philosophical conceptions of 
the self: implications for cognitive science. 
trends in Cognitive sciences 4(1): 14–21. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4360
Gallagher S. (2001) The practice of mind: 
Theory, simulation, or primary interaction? 
Journal of Consciousness studies 8(5–7): 
83–107.
Gallagher S. (2005) How the body shapes the 
mind. oxford university Press, oxford.
Gallagher S. (2006) Where’s the action? Epiphe-
nomenalism and the problem of free will. in: 
Banks W., Pockett s. & Gallagher s. (eds.) 
does consciousness cause behavior? an 
19
Decentering the Brain  shaun gallagher
4E Cognition
               http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher
investigation of the nature of volition. Mit 
Press, Cambridge Ma: 109–124.
Gallagher S. (2007) The natural philosophy of 
agency. Philosophy Compass 2(2): 347–357.
Gallagher S. (2008a) direct perception in the 
intersubjective context. Consciousness and 
Cognition 17: 535–543.
Gallagher S. (2008b) inference or interaction: 
social cognition without precursors. Philo-
sophical Explorations 11(3): 163–173.
Gallagher S. (2012) Multiple aspects of agency. 
new ideas in Psychology 30: 15–31.
Gallagher S. (2013a) ambiguity in the sense of 
agency. in: Clark a., Kiverstein J. & vierkant 
t. (eds.) decomposing the will. oxford 
university Press, oxford: 118–135.
Gallagher S. (2013b) a pattern theory of self. 
Frontiers in Human neuroscience 7(443): 
1–7.
Gallagher S. (2013c) intersubjectivity and 
psychopathology. in: Fulford B., davies 
M., Graham G., sadler J. & stanghellini G. 
(eds.) oxford Handbook of philosophy of 
psychiatry. oxford university Press, oxford: 
258–274.
Gallagher S. (2015a) seeing things in the right 
way: normativity in social perception. in: 
doyon M. & Breyer t. (eds.) normativity in 
Perception. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basing-
stoke: 117–127.
Gallagher S. (2015b) reuse and body-formatted 
representations in simulation theory. Cogni-
tive systems research 34–35: 35–43.
Gallagher S. (2017) Enactivist interventions: 
rethinking the mind. oxford university 
Press, oxford.
Gallagher S. (2018) Building a stronger concept 
of embodiment. in: newen a., de Bruin L. 
& Gallagher s. (eds.) The oxford handbook 
of 4E cognition. oxford university Press, 
oxford: 353–367.
Gallagher S. & Allen M. (2018) active inference, 
enactivism and the hermeneutics of social 
cognition. synthese 195(6): 2627–2648. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4222
Gallagher S. & Bower M. (2014) Making enac-
tivism even more embodied. avant 5(2): 
232–247. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4495
Gallagher S. & Daly A. (2018) dynamical 
relations in the self-pattern. Frontiers in 
Psychology 9: 664.
Gallagher S., Hutto D., Slaby J. & Cole J. (2013) 
The brain as part of an enactive system. Be-
havioral and Brain sciences 36(4): 421–422. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/2510
Gallagher S. & Meltzoff A. (1996) The earliest 
sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and 
recent developmental studies. Philosophical 
Psychology 9(2): 213–236.
Gallagher S. & Zahavi D. (2012) The phenom-
enological mind. routledge, London.
Gallese V. (2001) The “shared manifold” 
hypothesis: From mirror neurons to 
empathy. Journal of Consciousness studies 
8: 33–50.
Gallese V. (2014) Bodily selves in relation: 
Embodied simulation as second-person per-
spective on intersubjectivity. Philosophical 
transactions of the royal society B: Biologi-
cal sciences 369: 20130177.
Gallup G. G., Anderson J. R. & Platek S. M. 
(2011) self-recognition. in: Gallagher s. 
(ed.) The oxford handbook of the self. 
oxford university Press, oxford: 80–110.
Garcia E. & Di Paolo E. (2018) Embodied coor-
dination and psychotherapeutic outcome: 
Beyond simple mappings. Frontiers in 
Psychology 9: 1257. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fpsyg.2018.01257.
Gazzaniga M. S. (1998) The mind’s past. univer-
sity of California Press, Berkeley.
Gibson J. J. (1977) The theory of affordances. 
in: shaw r. & Bransford J. (eds.) Perceiving, 
acting, and knowing. Erlbaum, Hillsdale nJ: 
67–82.
Gillihan S. J. & Farah M. J. (2005) is self 
special? a critical review of evidence from 
experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin 131(1): 
76–97.
Goldman A. (2006) simulating minds: The 
philosophy, psychology and neuroscience 
of mindreading. oxford university Press, 
oxford.
Goldman A. I. (2012) a moderate approach 
to embodied cognitive science. review of 
Philosophy and Psychology 3(1): 71–88.
Goldman A. I. (2014) The bodily formats ap-
proach to embodied cognition. in: Kriegel 
u. (ed.) Current controversies in philosophy 
of mind. routledge, new York: 91–108. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/5191
Goldman A. & de Vignemont F. (2009) is social 
cognition embodied? trends in Cognitive 
sciences 13(4): 154–159.
Goodwin C. (2000) action and embodiment 
within situated human interaction. Journal 
of Pragmatics 32: 1489–1522.
Goodwin C. (2017) Co-operative action. Cam-
bridge university Press, Cambridge.
Gopnik A. & Meltzoff A. N. (1997) Words, 
thoughts and theories. Mit Press, Cam-
bridge Ma.
Gutchess A. H., Kensinger E. A., Yoon C., 
Schacter D. L. (2007) ageing and the self-
reference effect in memory. Memory 15: 
822–837.
Haggard P. (2017) sense of agency in the human 
brain. nature reviews neuroscience 18(4): 
196–207.
Haggard P. & Eimer M. (1999) on the relation 
between brain potentials and the awareness 
of voluntary movements. Experimental 
Brain research 126: 128–133.
Haggard P. & Magno E. (1999) Localising aware-
ness of action with transcranial magnetic 
stimulation. Experimental Brain research 
127: 102–107.
Helmholtz H. von (1867) Handbuch der physi-
ologischen optik. Leopold voss, Leipzig. 
English translation: Helmholtz H. (2005) 
treatise on physiological optics. Edited by J. 
southall. dover Publications, Mineola nY.
Hobson P. (1993) The emotional origins of social 
understanding. Philosophical Psychology 6: 
227–249.
Hobson P. (2002) The cradle of thought. Macmil-
lan, London.
Hohwy J. (2013) The predictive mind. oxford 
university Press, oxford.
Hohwy J. (2016) The self-evidencing brain. noûs 
50(2): 259–285.
Hohwy J. & Michael J. (2017) Why should any 
body have a self. in: de vignemont F. & 
alsmith a. (eds.) The subject’s matter. Mit 
Press, Cambridge Ma: 363–391.
Huber L. & Kutschenko L. K. (2009) Medi-
cine in a neurocentric world: about the 
explanatory power of neuroscientific models 
in medical research and practice. Medicine 
studies 1(4): 307–313.
Hurley S. L. (1998) Consciousness in action. 
Harvard university Press, Cambridge Ma.
Husserl E. (1989) ideas pertaining to a pure 
phenomenology and to a phenomenological 
philosophy – second Book: studies in the 
phenomenology of constitution. translated 
by rojcewicz r. & schuwer a. Kluwer aca-
demic, dordrecht.
Hutto d., Gallagher s., ilundáin-agurruza J. & 
Hipólito i. (in press) Culture in mind – an 
enactivist account: not cognitive penetration 
but cultural permeation. in: Kirmayer L. J., 
Kitayama s., Worthman C. M., Lemelson 





















 ConstruCtivist Foundations vol. 14, n°1
and brain: Emerging concepts, models, ap-
plications. Cambridge university Press, new 
York nY.
Hutto D. D. & Myin E. (2013) radicalizing en-
activism: Basic minds without content. Mit 
Press, Cambridge Ma.
Høffding S. (2015) a phenomenology of expert 
musicianship. Phd thesis, department of 
Philosophy, university of Copenhagen, 
Copenhagen.
Ilundáin-Agurruza J. (2016) Holism and the 
cultivation of excellence in sports and per-
formance. routledge, London.
James W. (1950) Principles of Psychology. dover, 
new York. originally published in 1890.
Johnson S. C. (2000) The recognition of mental-
istic agents in infancy. trends in Cognitive 
science 4(1): 22–28.
Johnson S., Slaughter V. & Carey S. (1998) 
Whose gaze will infants follow? The elicita-
tion of gaze-following in 12-month-old in-
fants. developmental science 1(2): 233–238.
Jones S. S. (2006) Exploration or imitation? The 
effect of music on 4-week-old infants’ tongue 
protrusions. infant Behavior and develop-
ment 29(1): 126–130.
Jones P. H. (2009) introducing neuroeducational 
research: neuroscience, education and the 
brain from contexts to practice. routledge, 
London.
Jones S. S. (2009) The development of imitation 
in infancy. Philosophical transactions of the 
royal society of London B: Biological sci-
ences 364(1528): 2325–2335.
Kant I. (1996) Practical philosophy. Edited and 
translated by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
Keven N. & Akins K. A. (2017) neonatal imita-
tion in context: sensory-motor development 
in the perinatal period. Behavioral and Brain 
sciences 40: E381.
Kircher T. T. J., Senior C., Phillips M. L., 
Benson P. J., Bullmore E. T., Brammer M., 
Simmons A., Williams S. C. R., Bartels M. 
& David A. S. (2000) towards a functional 
neuroanatomy of self processing: Effects of 
faces and words. Cognitive Brain research 
10: 133–144.
Lakoff G. & Johnson M. (1999) Philosophy in 
the flesh: The embodied mind and its chal-
lenge to western thought. Basic Books, new 
York.
Lee S. E., VanderPloeg A. & Strifler J. (2016) 
The neurocentric view on consumers of cot-
ton: an application of consumer neurosci-
ence. in: Proceedings of the itaa annual 
Conference. annual Conference Proceed-
ings #73. iowa state university digital 
repository: 1–2. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
itaa_proceedings/2016/presentations/98.
Legerstee M. (1991) The role of person and 
object in eliciting early imitation. Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology 51(3): 
423–33.
Legrand D. & Ruby P. (2009) What is self specif-
ic? a theoretical investigation and a critical 
review of neuroimaging results. Psychologi-
cal review 116(1): 252–282.
Libet B. (1985) unconscious cerebral initiative 
and the role of conscious will in voluntary 
action. Behavioral and Brain sciences 8: 
529–566.
Libet B. (1992) The neural time-factor in 
perception, volition, and free will. revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale 2: 255–272.
Limanowski J. & Blankenburg F. (2013) 
Minimal self-models and the free energy 
principle. Frontiers in human neuroscience 
7: 547.
Lou H. C., Luber B., Crupain M., Keenan J. P., 
Nowak M., Kjaer T. W., Sackeim H. A. & 
Lisanby S. H. (2004) Parietal cortex and rep-
resentation of the mental self. Proceedings of 
the national academy of sciences usa 101: 
6827–6832.
Mackenzie C. & Stoljar N. (2000) introduc-
tion: autonomy refigured. in: Mackenzie 
C. & stoljar n. (eds.) relational autonomy: 
Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, 
and the social self. oxford university Press, 
oxford: 3–31.
Malafouris L. (2013) How things shape the 
mind. Mit Press, Cambridge Ma.
Malafouris L. (2015) Metaplasticity and the 
primacy of material engagement. time and 
Mind 8(4): 351–371.
Maurer D. & Barrera M. E. (1981) infants’ 
perception of natural and distorted arrange-
ments of a schematic face. Child develop-
ment 52(1): 196–202.
Mead G. H. (1913) The social self. Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology, and scientific 
Methods 10(14): 374–380.
Meltzoff A. N. & Moore M. K. (1977) imitation 
of facial and manual gestures by human 
neonates. science 198(4312): 75–78.
Meltzoff A. & Moore M. K. (1994) imitation, 
memory, and the representation of persons, 
infant Behavior and development 17: 
83–99.
Merleau-Ponty M. (2003) nature: Course notes 
from the College de France, ed. r. vallier. 
northwestern university Press, Evanston.
Metzinger T. (2004) Being no one: The self-
model theory of subjectivity. Mit Press, 
Cambridge.
Moutoussis M., Fearon P., El-Deredy W., 
Dolan R. J. & Friston K. J. (2014) Bayesian 
inferences about the self (and others): 
a review. Consciousness and Cognition 25: 
67–76.
Nagy E., Pal A. & Orvos H. (2014) Learning to 
imitate individual finger movements by the 
human neonate. developmental science 17: 
841–57.
Nagy E., Pilling K., Orvos H. & Molnar P. 
(2013) imitation of tongue protrusion in 
human neonates: specificity of the response 
in a large sample. developmental Psychology 
49(9): 1628.
Naumann R. (2016) dynamics in the brain and 
dynamic frame theory for action verbs. in: 
Brunel L., versace r. & Brouillet d. (eds.) 
The sensory nature of knowledge. Proceed-
ings of the sMCLC-11. düsseldorf univer-
sity Press, düsseldorf: 109–130.
Neisser U. (1988) Five kinds of self-knowledge. 
Philosophical Psychology 1: 35–59.
Newen A., Welpinghus A. & Juckel G. (2015) 
Emotion recognition as pattern recogni-
tion: The relevance of perception. Mind & 
Language 30(2): 187–208.
Northoff G. & Bermpohl F. (2004) Cortical 
midline structures and the self. trends in 
Cognitive sciences 8: 102–107.
Northoff G., Heinzel A., de Greck M., Bennpohl 
F., Dobrowolny H. & Panksepp J. (2006) 
self-referential processing in our brain: a 
meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. 
neuroimage 31: 440–457.
Northoff G. & Panksepp J. (2008) The trans-
species concept of self and the subcortical–
cortical midline system. trends in Cognitive 
sciences 12(7): 259–264.
Noë A. (2004) action in perception. Mit Press, 
Cambridge Ma.
O’Regan J. K. & Noë A. (2001) a sensorimotor 
account of vision and visual conscious-
ness. Behavioral and Brain sciences 24(5): 
939–973. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/2285
Platek S. M., Myers T. E., Critton S. R. & Gal-
lup G. G. (2003) a left-hand advantage for 
self-description: The impact of schizotypal 
personality traits. schizophrenia research 
65: 147–151.
21
Decentering the Brain  shaun gallagher
4E Cognition
               http://constructivist.info/14/1/008.gallagher
Popper K. R. & Eccles J. C. (1977) The self and 
its brain: an argument for interactionism. 
springer international, new York.
Postle N., McMahon K. L., Ashton R., Meredith 
M. & de Zubicaray G. I. (2008) action 
word meaning representations in cyto-
architectonically defined primary and 
premotor cortex. neuroimage 43: 634–644.
Pulvermüller F. (2005) Brain mechanisms 
linking language and action. nature reviews 
neuroscience 6: 576–582.
Purves D. (1988) Body and brain: a trophic 
theory of neural connections. Harvard 
university Press, Cambridge Ma.
Ramstead M. J. D., Badcock P. B. & Friston K. 
J. (2018) answering schrödinger’s question: 
a free-energy formulation. Physics of Life 
review 24: 1–16.
Reddy V. (2008) How infants know minds. 
Harvard university Press, Cambridge Ma.
Rizzolatti G., Fadiga L., Gallese V. & Fogassi L. 
(1996) Premotor cortex and the recognition 
of motor actions. Cognitive Brain research 
3(2): 131–141.
Rochat P. (2011) What is it like to be a newborn. 
in: Gallagher s. (ed.) The oxford handbook 
of the self. oxford university Press, oxford: 
57–79.
Ruby P., Collette F., D’Argembeau A., Peters F., 
Degueldre C., Balteau E., Luxen A., Maquet 
P., Salmon E. (2009) Perspective taking to 
assess self-personality: What’s modified in 
alzheimer’s disease? neurobiology of aging 
30: 1637–1651.
Röhricht F., Gallagher S., Geuter U. & Hutto 
D. D. (2014) Embodied cognition and 
body psychotherapy: The construction of 
new therapeutic environments. sensoria: 
a Journal of Mind, Brain & Culture 10(1): 
11–20.
Schechtman M. (2011) The narrative self. in: 
Gallagher s. (ed.) The oxford handbook of 
the self. oxford university Press, oxford: 
394–416.
Searle J. R. (1983) intentionality: an essay in the 
philosophy of mind. Cambridge university 
Press, Cambridge.
Seth A. K. (2013) interoceptive inference, 
emotion, and the embodied self. trends 
in Cognitive sciences 17(11): 565–573. 
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4518
Seth A. K., Suzuki K. & Critchley H. D. (2011) 
an interoceptive predictive coding model of 
conscious presence. Frontiers in Psychology 
2: 395.
Shelley B. P. (2013) Brain wellbeing and brain-
healthy lifestyle in the neurocentric age. 
archives of Medicine and Heath sciences 
1(2): 99–102.
Strawson G. (1999) The self. in: Gallagher s. & 
shear J. (eds.) Models of the self. imprint 
academic, Exeter: 1–24.
Sutton J. (2010) Exograms and interdisciplinarity: 
History, the extended mind and the civilizing 
process. in: Menary r. (ed.) The extended 
mind. Mit Press, Cambridge Ma: 189–225.
Taylor C. (1989) sources of the self: The making 
of the modern identity. Harvard university 
Press, Cambridge Ma.
Thompson E. (2007) Mind in life: Biology, 
phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. 
Harvard university Press, Cambridge Ma. 
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/117
Thompson E. & Stapleton M. (2009) Mak-
ing sense of sense-making: reflections on 
enactive and extended mind theories. topoi 
28(1): 23–30. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/2290
Titley H. K., Brunel N. & Hansel C. (2017) 
toward a neurocentric view of learning. 
neuron 95(1): 19–32.
Tollefsen D. & Gallagher S. (2017) We-narratives 
and the stability and depth of shared agency. 
Philosophy of the social sciences 47(2): 
95–110.
Trevarthen C. (1979) Communication and 
cooperation in early infancy: a description 
of primary intersubjectivity. in: Bullowa 
M. (ed.) Before speech: The Beginning of 
interpersonal Communication. Cambridge 
university Press, Cambridge.
Trevarthen C. (1999) Musicality and the intrinsic 
motive pulse: Evidence from human psycho-
biology and infant communication. Musicae 
scientiae 3(1 suppl): 155–215.
Trevarthen C., Aitken K. J., Nagy E., Delafield-
Butt J. T. & Vandekerckhove M. (2006) 
Collaborative regulations of vitality in early 
childhood: stress in intimate relationships 
and postnatal psychopathology. in: Cic-
chetti d. & Cohen d. J. (ed.) developmental 
Psychopathology. John Wiley and sons, new 
York: 65–126.
Turk D. J., Heatherton T. F., Macrae C. N., Kel-
ley W. M. & Gazzaniga M. S. (2003) out of 
contact, out of mind: The distributed nature 
of the self. annals of the new York academy 
of science 1001: 65–78.
Velleman J. D. (2005) self as narrator. in: Christ-
man J. & anderson J. (eds.) autonomy and 
the challenges to liberalism: new Essays. 
Cambridge university Press, new York: 
56–76.
Vincini S. & Jhang Y. (2018) association but 
not recognition: an alternative model for 
differential imitation from 0 to 2 months. 
review of Philosophy and Psychology 9(2): 
395–427.
Vincini S., Jhang Y., Buder E. H. & Gallagher S. 
(2017a) an unsettled debate: Key empiri-
cal and theoretical questions are still open 
(Commentary on Keven and akins) Behav-
ioral and Brain sciences 40: E401.
Vincini S., Jhang Y., Buder E. H. & Gallagher S. 
(2017b) neonatal imitation: Theory, experi-
mental design and significance for the field 
of social cognition. Frontiers in Psychology 
– Cognitive science 8: 1323.
Vogeley K. & Gallagher S. (2011) The self in 
the brain. in: Gallagher s. (ed.) The oxford 
handbook of the self. oxford university 
Press, oxford: 111–136.
Walker A. S. (1982) intermodal perception of 
expressive behaviors by human infants. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 
33(3): 514–35.
Weizsäcker V. von. (1986) der Gestaltkreis: 
Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und 
Bewegen. Fifth edition. Thieme, stuttgart.
Willems R. M., Toni I., Hagoort P. & Casasanto 
D. (2009) neural dissociations between ac-
tion verb understanding and motor imagery. 
Journal of Cognitive neuroscience 22: 
2387–2400.
Woodward A. L. & Sommerville J. A. (2000) 
twelve-month-old infants interpret action in 
context. Psychological science 11: 73–77.
received: 11 June 2018 
accepted: 4 september 2018
